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ABSTRACT
A new Product Liability (PL) Act in Japan became
effective in July, 1995.

In the United States, congress

passed, subject to the endorsement of the president, the
legislation that limits the ceiling of compensations and
punitive damages in PL cases.

Thus, there seems to be a

converging tendency between the Japanese system, which has
relative emphasis on industrial interests and encouraged off
court settlements, and the U.S. system, which has relatively
emphasized consumers' interest and encouraged litigation.

A

large difference exists between the United States and Japan,
particularly in the number of suits about product liability.
For example, within a half year after the enforcement of the
new PL Act, only a single case was brought to court in Japan.
This paper explains the legal content, the social
background and the legislation process of the new PL Act in
Japan.

Using economic analysis, it clarifies the question of

what the qonsequences are with the difference in legal systems
on resource allocation in the two countries.
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Koichi Hamada*
1. Introduct ion

On June 22nd, 1994, in the midst of the political turmoil
that gave birth to the first cabinet to be headed by the
Socialist Party in many years, the Product Liability Act (PL
Act) passed Japan's Diet.
1st, 1995.

The law became effective on July

This was the first time a special law to safeguard

consumers against hazardous products had been enacted in
Japan.·

This enactment was realized after more than twenty

years of serious struggles among related parties, struggles
that began when an advisory council in the Economic Planning
Agency proposed the legislatio n of a Product Liability Law.
Understan dably, producers in the industria l sectors
strongly opposed legislatio n of the PL Act.

Until 1995, legal

cases concernin g defective products were handled by the
applicatio n of tradition al civil law, in particula r Article
709 on torts.

Firms were afraid that the "liability crisis"

or the "litigatio n explosion" in the United States might be
imported to Japan.

At the same time, in almost all developed

*ram indebted to Messieurs Atsushi Kato (Economic Growth
Center), Katsuhiko Masubuchi (JETRO NY), Makoto Sakurai (Mitsui
Marine Research Institute ), Motoyoshi Shizui (Economic Planning
Agency) , and Minoru Tokumoto (Yale Law School} for valuable
discussio ns and data. Also I thank Sunghyn Kim for his research
assistanc e.
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and developing countries and post socialist countries,
including China, no-fault product liabilities were being
introduced.

Accordingly, Japan had begun to appear to be

anachronisti c in the field of product liability.

The export

expansion of Japanese goods that were produced under an easier
PL standard could have been regarded by trade partners as
social dumping.

The new PL Act remedied this embarrassmen t

or, at least, eased the situation.
It is too early to assess the total impact of this epoch
making legislation.

As far as I know, however, there has been

only a single court action related to the PL Act up to the
In spite of the increased protection of consumers

present.

under the PL Act and all the media attention, the Japanese
public has yet to change its attitudes toward defective
products and, particularly , toward legal actions associated
with them.
The legislation of the PL Act was an important legal
reform.

It was also an economic reform since the study of

product liability is one of the few areas in which law and
economics interact very closely.

This paper studies the

economic implications of the new PL Act from a comparative
perspective.
The differences in existing PL laws, as well as the
differences in their practical applications , in Japan and the
United States indicate the characterist ics of the two market
economies and the societies.

One observes the contrast
2

between a close-knit consensus-bu ilding society and an
individualis tic, litigious society.

Japan puts priority on

the relatively harmonious coordination of economic activities
even at the risk of neglecting consumer interests.

The United

states emphasizes competitive and innovative activities.

It

puts priority on the protection of individual rights by due
process, even though that is costly.
A comparison of the substance of PL laws cannot be done
properly without discussing differences in procedural law
(Kobayashi, 1992).

Thus, when I describe the impact of the

introduction of the PL Act in Japan in a comparative
perspective, I will also pay attention to the difference in
procedures.

This is the first point to be emphasized in this

paper.
The comparative effects of different PL laws and
procedures, say the Japanese and the American, present an
interesting question that can be answered by modern economic
analysis.

What affects the economic outcome of the product

liability system is not only the strength of consumer
protection in the substantive law but also the existence or
non-existenc e of the contingent fee combined with the jury
system.
The legislation and application of PL laws has
internationa l implications in a world in which countries
interact by trade, direct investment, and capital flows.

The

presence of rigorous PL law in the United states is probably
3

working to make Japanese exporters more cautious, even though
they are accustomed to being shielded by the relative lack of
PL suits from Japanese consumers at home.

On the other hand,

recent moves by the U.S. Congress seem to indicate that
sentiment in favor of moving the extreme American PL system
toward more reasonable ways of preventing defective products
without cumulative legal costs.
In this paper I give a short overview of the legal
economic situation in Japan after the legislation of the PL
Act in a comparative perspective with respect to the United
States.

Then I consider whether modern economic theory can

give guidelines to evaluate and improve the present
situations.
In Section 2, I describe the basic features of the PL
Act.

Then in Section 3, I trace the responses of the actors

in the Japanese scene:

consumers, producers, insurance

companies, lawyers, and the government.

In Section 4, I

analyze the economic implications of Japan's PL system by
comparing them with the functioning of the more litigious U.S.
system.

Finally, in the last section I briefly mention the

role of the PL system in the integrated world economy.

2.

Features of the New Product Liability Act
The new Product Liability Act (Seizobutsu Sekinin Ho)

passed the diet after a long tug-of-war period between
consumers and lawyers on the one hand and producers on the
4

other.

According to the new Act (PL act), the existence of a

defect, the occurrence of damages, and the causality between
the defect and the damages should be proven by the plaintiff.
However, once the plaintiff proves these three factors, the
existence of negligence and the causality between the
negligence and the defect need not be proved by the plaintiff.
In the process of legislating the PL Act, it was
discussed whether the definition of a product should include
non-tangibles such as computer software.

The new PL Act

limits the project to tangible objects.
The PL Act allows the defendant to use a defense of
"inevitable risks of technology development."

Firms can make

a plea insisting that, to the best of their scientific
knowledge, they could not have known that they had produced a
defective product.

To encourage development of technology,

medication and medical equipment, and to promote
entrepreneurship of firms, proponents of this defense argued
that the risks they cannot foresee at the time of development
should be excused from product liabilities.

Others who were

opposed to this clause felt that it just gave firms more
reasons to fight against plaintiffs, including those who were
seriously injured or killed.
In the absence of externalities with respect to knowledge
and inventions, there is little reason from an economic
standpoint to allow for this defense of development risks.
However, as long as there are externalities in knowledge and
5

invention, as I believe is true, this clause can be justified
at least in part by economic reasons.
There has been an active debate about whether or not the
presumption of the existence of defect, and the presumption of
the causality between defects and damages on the part of
victims should be incorporated in the new Act.

It is argued

that the detailed data, for example, of chemical, clinical,
animal, and other experiments, are kept by the producers.
Thus, by virtue of difficulty in obtaining data, the plaintiff
has difficulty in proving the existence of a defect and the
causality between the defect and the damage.
I consider, however, that for many products consumers or
users have better access to the relevant evidence.

some

accidents take place because of the misuse of machinery,
cosmetics, and so forth, and the person who can most easily
provide evidence to the court is the person who is near the
commodity at the time of the accident (i.e., the consumer, the
user, or the victim).

In this sense, the general approach of

the PL Act may be sound.

However, for some specific products

such as pharmaceutical products, producers accumulate most of
the crucial evidence regarding such things as defective
medication that could cause health hazards.

Without those

physical, chemical, biological, experimental, and
epidemiological data, the plaintiff would be in a difficult
position to prove the defect and the causality between the
defect and the damage.
6

Kato (1994) proposes that the PL Act should be amended in
such a way that the court can, when needed, request firms to
present evidence related to the defect and the causality.

If

the firms do not reveal sufficient evidence, then the court
can decide that the -firm has the burden of proof for the
nonexistence of the defect and causality.

This seems to be a

persuasive argument provided that the revelation process does
not turn into an expensive discovery process as is common in
the United States.

Again, the principle is that people who

have closer access to evidence should bear the burden of
proof.
On the other side of the Pacific, attempts are being made
in the United States to make PL laws for producers less
stringent.

The House of Representativ es and the Senate, both

of which are now under Republican majority, passed bills that
would restrict the amount of product liability awards.

The

House bill intends to restrict punitive damages in all civil
suits to $250,000 or three times the plaintiff's economic
losses in all civil suits, to allow manufacturer s of products
to use the defense of having received Food and Drug
Administrati on {FDA) approval, and to shift the court fees to
The Senate bill is more

the party who loses the case.

moderates and its main emphasis is to limit the punitive
damages in product liability suits.
Lawyers and consumer advocates like Ralph Nader strongly
oppose these bills.

And, the President is expected to veto
7

any strong measure of limiting the tort liability.
Nevertheless, this move is a move, though very slight, of the
American legal system toward a less expensive system of
conflict resolution. 1

This is an interesting contrast to the

case of Japan where people are moving very slowly toward more
protection of consumers' rights.

3.

Actors on the scene of Product Liability
Let us begin with a description of the characteristics of

the main actors who interact with respect to the occurrence or
the possible occurrence of defective products in Japan.

3.1.

Consumers
In any society, consumer sovereignty is more myth than

reality.

Japan's consumers either willingly, reluctantly, or

out of ignorance, to endure the extremely high price of rice
and other agricultural commodities.

Trade conflicts

surrounding Japan could have been mitigated if Japan's
consumers fully understood the merit of imports and expressed
preferences for less expensive and more varied consumption

1 It

is hard to obtain quantitative data in this field.
People do not collect legal statistics as extensively as they do
National Income Statistics. Business Week (September 26, 1994)
reports that the lawyers gave $20 million to candidates in
California, Texas, and Alabama alone. This may help to explain
the success of lawyers who have repeatedly blocked moves to
limit product liability laws.
8

bundles. 2
The influence of consumer organizations is modest, at
best, and occasionally in the wrong direction.

A consumer

organization once petitioned the government not to relax the
import ban of rice.
women.

These organizations consist mostly of

The central organization, "Shufuren," means the

housewife union, and it is often symbolized by a "rice
scoop. 113
With respect to product liability and defective
products, however, these organizations played an important
role.

Safety of the household is their utmost priority.

Their objective is to punish morally the producers of
defective products.

They pay less attention to the balance

among the amount of supply, the price of goods, and the
incidence of accidents with respect to a household good.
Scholars' concerns about consumers welfare is
insufficient in Japan (for an exception, see Ito (1992)).
Many treatises of anti-trust law, industrial law, and even
intellectual property right law start with the assertion that
2 It

is hard to find a "pure consumer" household because a
household cannot consume unless it produces something.
In the
case of Japan's consumers, many of them have agricultural (or
fishery) origins to which they return each summer and new year
for their ancestral worship (Hamada and Nakajo, 1986).
3 At

an OECD meeting on consumer issues I attended in the
1980s, I remember that a representative of an American consumer
organization asked a Japanese representative why Japanese
consumer unions do not work hard to liberalize the import of
rice and beef.
It was as impressive as the fact that European
delegates did not refer to the existence of agricultural
subsidies.
9

these laws are for the benefit of industries, and do not
explicitly mention the benefit of consumers.
Recent data on the consciousness of consumers about the
new PL Act are contained in an interview survey conducted by
the Prime Minister's Office (Sorifu, 1994).

Half a year after

the enactment of the PL Act, that is, in December 1994, 32.4%
of those interviewed knew about the PL Act, of these 12.0%
knew the objective of the new Act.

Sixty-five percent of the

interviewed did not know about the PL Act.

To the question

whether they were interested in the PL Act, 56.4% answered
"yes" and 41.5% answered "no" or "not so much."
The most interesting finding in this survey is the
question of how consumers' behavior will change because of the
act.

The answers chosen (multiple choice allowed) among

alternatives were:

(i)

Choose the product paying more attention to safety
in addition to price and quality:

29%,

(ii) Use products more carefully and safely, for example,
by reading the warnings on the products and the
legends for use:

27.3%,

(iii) When damaged by the accidents in products, bring
forth complaints more actively:

25.7%,

and
(iv) Keep the product when damaged by accidents in order
to investigate the cause:
10

19.7%.

Answers (i) and (ii) were more common among women.
Answer (iii) was more common among the younger generati on in
the thirty-y ear old age bracket, which I found most
interest ing.

In sum, 61.1% of individu als thought that

consume r behavio r would change and 33.7% thought that it would
not.

The latter answer was found more frequen tly among men.
This lukewarm attitude -- probably the more aggressi ve

attitude s are found among the younger generati ons with respect
is symboli cally presente d by the lack of new

to complai nts

suits in product liabilit y.

The Nikkei Newspap er reported on

Decembe r 26, 1995, that a restaura nt owner brought a court
action against a produce r of a paper contain er for tea.
contain er alleged ly hurt his thumb when it was opened.

The
The

plainti ff's demand was the compens ation of 910 thousand yen.
This is probably the only court action after the new PL Act
became that effectiv e has been reported .
In short, consume rs are usually friendly rather than
hostile with produce rs and governm ent institut ions.
often uninform ed or misinfor med.
into court.

They are

They seldom bring a case

The new PL Act has hardly changed this situatio n

and will change it only very slowly.

3.2. Produce rs
The Japanese economy is characte rized by the firm
dominate d economy , or Kaisha-b ased economy .

Under the

lifetime employm ent system, which may be eroding only
11

extremely slowly in the face of continuing recession and the
different attitude of younger generations, the firm is the
most important entity in an employee's life, much more
important than personal and family life.

In fact, a firm is a

quasi-family unit, where entertainmen t, excursions, parties,
and kinds of (social) security care take place.

The

individual family life is often subordinated to the objective
of the company.

In fact, Kaisha (company) has a family

structure by itself.

In a sense, individual families belong

to this big family, Kaisha.
The strong tradition of Zaibatsu (family conglomerate ,
financial clique) or Keiretsu (firm group) maintains this
organization al feature of Japan's production sectors.

During

the process of enactment of the PL Act, this strong tradition
worked effectively to postpone the legislation despite
pressures from consumers, lawyers, insurance companies and
parts of the government. 4

The internationa l situation such as

the initiation of the EC directive for product liability and
the fear that Japan would be left behind made firms agree with
the enactment of the PL Act.
Large businesses were now ready to cope with the more
organized system of quasi strict liability.

4

They had started

of
{Ministry
MITI
believed that
generally
is
It
industrial
of
proponent
the
Internationa l Trade and Industry) is
interests and that the EPA (Economic Planning Agency) is the
proponent of consumers. This kind of characteriza tion is often
too simplistic. Even within each ministry some sections support
one side and some support the other side.
12

preparing for the new law even before it was legislated.
Firms have made strong efforts to deal with complaints on
their products.

They hope that many complaints will be

handled by consultation s, mutual negotiations , and settlements
rather than expensive legal processes.
product liability insurance.

They can make use of

The defense of development risks

will surely help the position of large firms that depend on
modern technology.
Corporations are eager to set up facilities of
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR).

Home Electric Products

PL Center, Automobile Product Liability Consulting Center, and
Residential Construction Parts PL Center are examples of
numerous organization s of this kind (Hayashida, 1995).

In the

corporate culture where suits are not welcomed, firms find it
more convenient and comfortable to resolve conflicts through
negotiations with claimants.

Firms hope that the ADR system

will work to seat claimants at the negotiating table rather
than lead them to courts.
speed of settlements.

consumers can benefit from the

Lawyers in Japan, however, criticize

these facilities because the process is not open, the
discovery of evidence is imperfect, and precedents do not
naturally exist.
For small and medium companies (SMCs), say companies with
fewer than 1000 employees, are in general more seriously
affected by the PL Act.

The defense of development risks is

of limited value because SMCs do not necessarily use the
13

technolog y at the frontier of knowledge .
of PL insurance can be heavy.

Moreover, the burden

Recently, insurance companies

developed group insurance for SMCs.

Companies join as a group

to a pool for insurance whose payments to the insured may be
limited by a certain amount.
In the case of restauran ts, for example, The Japan Food
Hygiene Cooperati ve {Nihon Shokuhin Eisei Kyokai) pools
premiums and makes contracts with the insurance companies .
Thus restauran ts that have to suspend business will be able to
receive partial compensat ion.

It is usually less expensive to

be insured through the cooperativ e.

Also insurance companies

help in negotiatio ns with consumers . In fiscal year (FY) 1993,
about 70% of restauran ts joined the cooperativ e (Hayashid a,
1995)

0

Finally, under the Japanese PL Act, not only a natural
person but also an incorpora ted person (a firm) can claim
compensat ion for the damage.

This adds to the concerns of

parts producers in that they may be sued by firms that buy
their products.

3.3.

Insurance Companies
In Japan, liability insurance was first available in 1957

(Hayashid a, 1995).

In FY 1992, the net insurance premium for

the liability insurance of all the insurance companies in
Japan amounted to 228 billion yen which is about 3.7% of the
total net premium for all kinds of insurance .
14

In FY 1993, the

net insurance premium for the liability insurance was 232
billion yen and about 3.6% of the total net premium for all
kinds of insurance.

In FY 1994, the net insurance premium for

the liability insurance of all the insurance companies in
Japan was 243 billion yen and again about 3.6% of the total
net premium for all kinds of insurance.

Liability insurance

does not necessarily cover all the insurance contracts related
to product liability, nor do the figures in these years
5
reflect the effect of the new PL law.

However, these

figures indicate that liability insurance has been increasing
steadily although the amount of PL- related insurance in Japan
has been relatively unimportant.

A liability crisis is far

from being a reality in Japan.
The 228 billion yen in liability insurance premiums in
1992 was about 0.04% of that year's GNP.

It is difficult to

sort out the premium corresponding to liability from the total
causality insurance premium for the United States.

According

to one calculation by the EPA, the U.S. spent $16.3 billion on
liability insurance in 1989, which is 7.8% of all the premiums
received by causality and fire insurance companies.

This was

0.31% of the $5.25 trillion U.S. GNP (EPA, 1993}.
Insurance companies in Japan also play an important role
in the propagation of knowledge about product liability.
Yasuda Research Institute (1989} and Tokyo Kaijo Research

5

one may argue that the steady increase implies that firms
were preparing for the forthcoming legislation.
15

Institute (1994} are typical examples of such activities.
More public consciousnes s will mean more business for them as
well.

3.4.

Lawyers
There is strong contrast in the number of lawyers in

Japan and the United States.

In 1993 there were 84,000

lawyers in the United states, while in 1994 there were only
18,400 lawyers in Japan, or roughly one twentieth.

Even if we

adjust for the size of populations, in the United States one
lawyer serves 307 people and in Japan one lawyer serves 6,768
people. 6
Of course, as Kato (1987} emphasizes, we have to compare
the legal, social, and economic functions of lawyers rather
than their mere numbers.

For example, there is a large number

of law undergraduat es in Japan who do not enter the legal
profession through the bar examination.

Most of them are

hired by firms as general employees or become public servants.
A substantial number of these non-lawyers in Japan engage in
legal activities that correspond to the activities of in-house
lawyers in U.S. firms such as legal consulting and advisory
activities.

6 The

correspondin g figures of people per lawyer for European
countries are larger than the United States -- 684, 964, and
1731 people respectively for the United Kingdom, Germany and
Funso Shori no Infura, Shiho Kakuju
France [Kubori, Hidaeki:
Mattanashi (Fortify the Legal System for Conflict Resolution},
Nikkei Business, January 1, 1996).
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Even though the number of lawyers is large in the U.S.,
the number of litigati on lawyers is not so numerou s.

Around
In

1985 the number of litigati on lawyers was about 49,000.
Japan there were 18,000 lawyers, but most of them, except

those who were judges or prosecu tors, could work as litigati on
lawyers.

Adjustin g again for size of populati on, the density

of litigati on lawyers was higher in the United States but not
very differen t (7 to 5) between the two countrie s (Kato,
1987) .
The total number of court decision s in Japan on product
liabilit y cases during the postwar period is still extreme ly
small, between 150 and 160.

In the United states, 13,188

cases in FY 1991 and 13,119 cases in FY 1992 were brought to
court.

This takes into account only those cases where the

7
federal courts were involved .

Why is the number of law suits so small in Japan?

The

traditio nal explana tion by Kawashim a {1968) and others is that
the Japanese do not regard legal actions to the court as
socially desirab le because the Japanese have a long traditio n
of respecti ng "harmony " among people.

The first Constitu tion

of Japan, establis hed in the 7th century, starts with the
phrase "Wa (harmony ) is the most importa nt."

to the Quayle Committ ee's Report, which has the
number of cases not only in the federal courts but in the state
courts as well, in 1989 about 18 million cases existed in
product liabilit y, and, during that year, 250 thousand cases
were accepted by the court.
7 Accordin g
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This historica l or cultural explanatio n has been
challenge d recently by alternativ e explanatio ns.

One

explanatio n emphasize s the supply side of legal services.

The

supply of lawyers in Japan is limited by the national bar
examinati on that is extremely competitiv e with a success rate
of slightly less than two percent.

Though somewhat relaxed in

recent years, each year fewer than a thousand people are
admitted as a pool for lawyers, prosecuto rs, and judges.
One may suspect that some monopoly rent due to the
restrictio n of the supply of lawyers emerges on the side of
lawyers.

The fact that American lawyers are eager to enter

into Japan's legal services market, in spite of the opposition
of Japan's Lawyers' Associatio n, can be interprete d as the
evidence of sufficien t rent.
The compariso n of earnings of lawyers between Japan and
the United States, however, does not completel y support this
supply limitation theory.

This theory implies differenc es in

the earnings of lawyers.

However, earnings of lawyers are not

conspicuo usly different .

According to Kato (1987), the

average or median earnings of Japanese lawyers in the early
1980s were likely to be lower those of U.S. lawyers.

Thus, it

is not merely the shortage of lawyers, but some factors on the
demand side, that make the number of suits small.
One deterrent to litigation in Japan is the existence of
high court fees and the absence of contingen t fees for
lawyers.

According to Hayashida (1995), the court fee for a
18

plaintiff in the U.S. is constant regardless of the amount of
the claim and is around $100, which an American attorney is
willing to expend because of contingent fee system.

In Japan,

on the other hand, the amount of the fee is roughly
proportional to the-claim.

For example, a claimant for 100

million yen(= around $1 million) is required to pay 400
thousand yen(= $4,000).
figures.)

(Kobayashi, 1995, has similar

Moreover, Japanese attorneys have a standard fee

schedule and do not rely on a contingent fee schedule.
Hayashida (1995) mentions two other factors as deterrents to
court actions in Japan:

a complicated document is required to

bring a case to court and the gloomy, dark atmosphere of court
buildings gives a negative image to people.
Another deterrent to litigation is the fact that court
actions in the Japanese system can take a very long time; five
years, on average, before judges' decisions are made (Haley,
1991).

Indeed, lawyers often do not encourage clients to

bring issues to court; in fact they sometimes even discourage
people from doing so, in great contrast to what "ambulance
chasers" do.

Thus, if the demand for legal service is not low

because of Japan's culture, social organization, or the nature
of its people, then it may actually be a result of actions
taken by lawyers. 8
Even though the number of cases of product liability is

8

For the effects of the variability in award and the absence
of the jury system, see Hamada (1995).
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extremely small in Japan, the contrary is experience d in some
serious cases of defective products.

The public became

seriously concerned with safety, particula rly in the 196Os,
when protests against polluting firms became vehement.

There

were many celebrate d cases of product liability , such as the
cases of Kanemi Oil, arsenic milk, SMON (subcate myelo-opt ico
neuropath y}, Chloroqui ne, and so forth.

In the case of Kanemi

Oil, a dangerous chemical normally used as a heat catalyst was
mistakenl y mixed with cooking oil.

SMON was a disease

triggered by an otherwise very effective drug for diarrhea and
amebic dysentery , Cinoform.

Chloroqui ne was a drug designed

to fight Malaria, which caused many serious side effects and
health hazards.
Recently, the case of alleged fire from a Matsushit a
television attracted attention .

The Osaka District Court

decided that the fact that a TV caught fire would indicate the
existence of negligenc e on the part of the producer.

The

Ministry of Welfare has been under fire because of the claim
by plaintiff s who are victims of infected processed blood that
the Ministry must have known about the danger of HIV infection
from the blood processed without heated sterilizat ion when it
approved its import.

Recently the Ministry acknowled ged that

it had known about the possibili ty.

The case of the nutrition

product, L-Triftoph an, in the foreign market will be discussed
later.

20

Let us consider some quantitative aspects of product
The National Life Center and its

hazards in Japan.

perfectural branches, Consumer Life Centers, indicate that
they receive complaints regarding defective products that
amount in value to 1.585 million yen.

Japanese consumers are

quite reluctant to complain to an official center.

They

estimate accordingly, that only 2 percent of them complain.
There are also other institutions that accept complaints, but
suppose, accordingly, that 60% of those who do complain go to
the Consumer Life Centers.

A report of the Economic Planning

Agency (EPA) on product liability calculates that 1.585/(0.02
x 0.6) = 1.585/(0.012) million yen= ¥132 billion was involved
in the damages caused by defective products and was hidden
from statistics.

Based on the exchange rate at that time,

about $1.1 billion were at stake.
The cost of food poisoning, which includes the causality
from dangerous blow fish (fugu), was calculated as being about
¥4 billion.

Damages from fire were ¥1.4 billion and those

from defective automobiles were estimated to be ¥11.4 billion.
These numbers total about ¥150 billion, or, at an exchange
conversion rate of 120 yen per dollar, approximately $1.3
billion in damages.

150 billion yen is about 0.03% of GDP.

In the Kanemi Oil case, the maximum awards to plaintiffs
was 6.3 billion yen, but these awards were given to tens of
plaintiffs.

In the United States, the total compensation for

the asbestos-related cases allegedly amounted to $20.9
21

billion.
The extent of payments to lawyers is usually considered
·to be 1/3 to 35% of the award by the court.

In Japan it is

certainly less, close to 8 to 10% of the awards.

Accordingly,

the flow of income to the legal profession associated with PL
disputes in Japan has been much smaller than that to U.S.
lawyers.
In summary, the ratio of the per capita number of lawyers
is one to twenty between Japan and the United States, the
number of cases brought to court is one to more than one
hundred, and the per capita GNP amount of money involved
through the insurance system for product liability is at least
one to ten in terms of insurance premia. 9
The costs incurred by legal processes in both countries
are hard to access precisely.

So are the costs for consumers

who cannot recover their damages.

We need further empirical

research to find the basic quantitative evidence to decide
which of the two systems is more tolerable even though both
are the second best.
Legal services are utilized to decide how to cut the pie,
but by themselves they do not enlarge the pie.

9 Estimates

One may deduce

vary. Business Week (December 4, 1995) cites a
study by Tillinghast-Towers Perrin which indicates that the
legal and administrative, jury and settlement costs related to
tort amount to 2.2% of the U.S. GDP, while in Japan this cost is
The U.S. figure hit a peak in 1985 at 2.5%, and
about 0.5%.
accordingly, it is decreasing, but is still higher than other
(The ratio is 1.3 in Italy and Germany,
industrial countries.
0.8% in the UK, France and Canada.)
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conventionally that a large flow of resources into legal
activities is not welcomed.

For some people, of course, it

has a value of its own to appeal to a court and to be awarded
proper compensation.

The American people, however, seem to

spend too much on dispute resolution with respect to product
liability.

3.5. Government
The Division of Human Life of the Economic Planning
Agency was instrumental in proposing, advocating, and drafting
the new PL Act.

It had organized a large number of meetings

and published the proceedings of these meetings since the idea
of legislating a PL law was initiated.

Other government

offices like the Industrial structure Section of the Ministry
of the International Trade and Industry also participated in
the process.
The Japanese government does not encourage court actions,
but does encourage consumers to be well informed about the
nature and the possible danger of a product.

The National

Life Center was established to collect information of
dangerous products, to test the safety of products, and to
train specialists on consumer affairs.
more than 260 Consumption Life Centers.

It is associated with
In its bulletin dated

July, 1994, the Center expressed its strong intention to help
consumers by providing counseling to them, publicizing
information, and assisting lawyers who bring suits to court.
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Hayashida (1995) describes this bulletin as "frightening" to
manufacturers.
Also, many ministries have opened offices for handling
consumers' claims: for example, the Ministry of Welfare for
medication, the MITI for manufactured products, and the
Ministry of Agriculture for food.

Municipal governments are

following the lead of the national government.

4o

Economic Analysis

Let us turn to the economic analysis of product
liability.
1988.)

(For a comprehensive synthesis, see Schwartz

Start from the simplest case where a product, say

bottled beer, may cause damage without a safety measure
(Demsetz (1972), Hamada (1976), and, in the context of labor
accident compensation, Williamson et al.

(1967)).

If the

producer spends some additional money on the product, the
damage can be prevented.
without difficulty.

This assumption can be relaxed

We shall assume that the expected value

of the damage does not depend on the level of consumers' care.
Suppose the consumers consist of individuals and their
marginal utility of income can be regarded as constant.
Accordingly, they are risk neutral, but we are allowed to use
the partial equilibrium framework.
In Figure 1 let DD be the demand curve for a product on
the condition that it is perfectly safe, and let SS be the
supply curve of the product without expenditure on the safety
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measure.

Under the validity of the partial equilibrium

analysis, the social gain is expressed by the social surplus,
that is, the sum of the consumers' and producers' surplus.
The maximum social surplus in the absence of product hazards
is realized as the area of the triangle DPS in the competitive
market, OP' being the competitive price.
Now let us introduce the danger from the product.

If the

expected value of the damage of explosion is DD*, the demand
curve for the unsafe product becomes D*D* if the consumers
know exactly the probability of damage.

Also let ss* be the

cost of the safety measure for the product, so that s*s* is
the supply curve of the safe product inclusive of the
expenditure on the safety measure.
If the producers are liable, they will compare the
expected value of the compensation with the cost for
implementing the safety measure.

Figure 1 is drawn in such a

way that ss* is smaller than DD*.

Accordingly, the economic

calculation of the producers lets them implement the safety
measure in this case because the producers' surplus is larger
with the safety measure.

Thus equilibrium R is realized, OR'

being the price.
If the consumers are liable, as long as the consumers are
perfectly aware of the probability and the magnitude of the
damage, DD shifts to D*D*.

Accordingly, it is more profitable

for the producers to produce the safe product because the
producers' surplus s*RR' with the safe product, is larger than
25

SQQ' with the unsafe product.
as well.

Thus R is realized in this case

Similarly, if ss* were larger than DD*, the

equilibrium corresponding to Qin Figure 1 would be chosen
regardless of which party would be liable for the damage.
Thus, regardless of the liability rule, and even in the
absence of explicit negotiations , the competitive market
realizes the maximization of the total surplus, provided that
the victims are limited to the purchasers of the product, and
that the consumers are fully aware of the expected cost of the
danger.

The direct or indirect price relationship between

producers and consumers enables them to engage in implicit
negotiations by imputing the burden of risk through the price.
Moreover, the distribution between consumers' surplus and
producers' surplus remains the same as long as the equilibrium
is given by R.

Thus the liability rule affects neither

resource allocation nor income distribution .

This

invariabilit y of income distribution with respect to the
liability rule is contrasted with the case of tort in general,
where the Coase Theorem gives the invariability of resource
allocation but not that of income distribution .
Neither the resource allocation nor the distribution
between the consumers' and the producers' surplus is affected
by the liability rule, provided that the consumers are fully
aware of the probability and magnitude of the damage due to
the product hazard, and that the victims are limited to the
purchasers of the product.

This is the starting point of our
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analysis.
In the real world, consumers are not expected to know
every possibility for a defect of a product.

If consumers are

liable, or if they cannot recover for damages caused by a
product, then producers are induced to produce an unsafe
product.

consumers who had the misconception that the product

is safe will buy the product and be harmed by its defect.
Figure 2 depicts the extreme case in which all the
consumers are ignorant about the possible defect of the
product.

If the expected value of the damage is equal to DD*,

the market price will be determined at P and consumers will
suffer the damage equal to the area of the shaded region.

In

the presence of misperception, the above neutrality theorem
does not hold, and consumers lose the amount equal to the
shaded area of DPVD*.

Strict liability improves this

situation, because all the burden of consumers is shifted to
producers.

Producers behave as if they were facing demand

curve D*D* of consumers, and accordingly choose Ras the
equilibrium output.
To make the situation more realistic, suppose some of the
consumers discern the possible danger, and the rest of them do
not.

Then the effective demand curve for the consumers as a

whole can be drawn as curve DXD** in Figure 3.
assumed that half the consumers are ignorant.

(Here it is
The demand

curve is constructed by adding the demand curve starting at D,
for the half of the population which recognizes, to the demand
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curve starting at D*, for the other half of the population
which does not.)

Here a liability rule that does not make

producers liable can lead to misallocation of resources.

In

this example where ss* is larger than DD*, producers do not
choose to adopt the safety device.
Thus, in the presence of misperception and in the absence
of legal costs, the producer's liability is better for
resource allocation.

If one introduces the aspects of legal

costs, settlement costs, and attorneys' costs, the situation
will again become more complicated.
Let us return to the world in which all of the consumers
misconceive a product to be perfectly safe in spite of the
danger.

Because of the existence of misconception, the system

of producer's liability is chosen.

Consumers are surprised by

the accident and we assume that they bring the case to court.
As mentioned above, in the United States consumers pay only a
nominal part of legal costs due to low court fees and the
existence of the contingent fee system.

Let us assume that

producers pay all the legal costs, and that all consumers
actually sue the producer after the accident.

Then, as in

Figure 4, the amount of damage DD* will be shifted to
producers as ST 1 •

The legal cost that is imposed on producers

is expressed as the distance T 1T 2 •

If the prevention cost on

the part of producers is small and like S~S~, then producers
are motivated to adopt the safety device and the market will
determine the price of the product at R1 •
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There will be no

need for legal processes and the magnitude of legal costs does
not matter to resource allocation.
If the cost of adopting a safety measure is as expensive
as

os;,

however, legal cost matters much in deciding whether

to adopt safety measures.

s;s;

If the cost of prevention curve

curve goes above T 2T 2 curve, then producers will give up

improving safety.

Therefore accidents occur, and the market

equilibrium is attained at Q.

The economy will "lose" the

shaded area, T 2 QLT 1 as the legal cost of negotiations ,
settlements and trials. 10

If

s2s2

lies between T 1 T1 and T 2 T 2 ,

one can easily see that the prevention measure will be adopted
but that is not socially optimal.

Producers overprotect

because of the burdens of legal cost on them.
Thus the following dilemma emerges.

In spite of the

necessity for producers to have the liability when consumers
misconceptio n occurs, a large legal cost has the following
production implication.

It makes producers spend more than

necessary for prevention, and reduce or suspend production or
services more than the desirable resource allocation requires.
In other words, the resources put into conflict resolution
are, in a sense, wasted.
Firms rely on insurance to protect themselves from paying
a large amount of the jury award that implicitly contains the
legal cost of a PL case.

Although insurance is a necessary

10 If the legal profession creates the services of providing

the feeling of fulfillment of clients' intentions or fulfillment
of justice, then this may not be a loss.
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and useful device for pooling risks, it may create problems
such as moral hazard and adverse selection.

In particular,

firms that have already paid insurance premiums may not spend
on the safety improvements .

In this case, the economic

incentive described .above will cease to work (moral hazard).
Producers charge a high price for their product to cover their
insurance premium, and that may harm the poor buyers rather
than the rich buyers (Priest, 1987).

Moreover, the firm may

stop producing the product if the cost of insurance is too
high.

ST 2 is too large to produce a good (service)!

Casual

evidence suggests that the insurance premium a Japanese
medical practitioner pays is about one or two per cent of what
an American doctor pays.

Because of the high insurance

premiums, doctors are said to avoid clinical practice in a
field like obstetrics.
A large jury award certainly benefits the plaintiff of
the case but, as a result, most consumers will lose by facing
higher prices.

The switching of the burden of court fees to

plaintiffs who lose may reduce legal costs in the case of
misconceptio n.

If consumers are fully aware of the damages

and expected court fees that are needed to recover the
damages, then those expected costs it will be reflected in the
demand curve.

Again the neutrality theorem along the line of

the Coase will prevail.

The court fee assigned to consumers

will be reflected in a higher price of the commodity.

If

consumers are not fully aware of the possibility, then it will
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help by reducing the expected costs to producers.

The same

applies to the maximum limit of award currently discussed in
the U.S. Congress.

It will certainly reduce the burden to

producers and accordingly mitigate the dilemma mentioned
above.
The jury is often said to determine the jury award such
that the award net of attorney's fees should equal the amount
of damages (Kobayashi, 1995; EPA, 1993).

Then the expected

cost that the defendant pays will include the attorney's fees
as well.

It can be shown, under the assumption of the free

entry of lawyers, that the defendant will pay the sum of
damage D and the capitalized value of I/n where I is the
attorney's fixed cost for pursuing the suit, and n is the
probability of winning the award. 11
The Japanese system tends to encourage production and new
development of goods.

But legal incentives to stop defective
Many consumers have been, and

products are not sufficient.

continue to be, compelled to endure the consequences of
defective products without being compensated either because of

11 suppose

(*)

the jury award Xis determined by
D

=

(1-p)X.

Under the free entry with no profit for lawyers

(**)

npX - I= 0

where pis the rate of the contingent fee.
From(*) and(**), one obtains
X

=

D + I/n.
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the lack of information or because of the lack of
opportunities to protest -- in particular, to appeal to a
court.
Legal costs certainly change the resource allocation and
income distribution.

Honoring the waiver clause on the

product by which consumers' give up claims will make the
natural selection possible.

In other words, the device in

which producers put waiver clauses of the compensation and
sell cheap products will work as a means of attaining Coase
type of solutions.
One direction that Japan's government emphasizes is to
make consumers aware both of the possibility of defective
products and of possible ways of recovering damages including,
but not necessarily confined to, court actions.

Reducing the

.
d d emand curve DXD ** , is
.
* * and t he uninforme
gap b etween DD
certainly a promising direction.
One puzzle is the phenomenon that Japanese firms are
committed to safe and high-quality products in spite of
Japan's less strict product liability law.

Probably one

reason for this is the existence of trade with more strict PL
countries, as will be explained in the last section.
reason is peer pressure.

Another

Defective products create social

issues; reputation is often more important than economic
calculation.
There must be a combination of incentive schemes that
guarantees the best outcome.

Probably the best system lies
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between the Japanese and the American system.

Easier

opportunities for the consumers to protest and allowance of
easier opportunities for attorneys to pursue the PL litigation
than in Japan will improve the incentives of producers to
improve safety and prevent consumers from being to accept the
damage or firms' conditions of settlements.

But probably the

best system will not be the adoption of punitive damages nor
that of the jury system.

The American system seems to be a

little biased toward the excessive use of legal procedures and
the excessive incentives for producers to prepare for the
damage.

So

Concluding Remarks
If we compare any two or more systems, we seldom find

that one system dominates others.

Most of the systems have

advantages as, well as disadvantages.

We have found that the

Japanese legal system tends to economize legal and
administration costs related to defective products even at the
cost of uncompensated consumers, and that the U.S. tort system
tends to compensate consumers at the cost of large legal and
administration costs which result in higher commodity prices.
Both systems are now slightly converging with each other.
The new PL Act will make Japan's consumers more protected,
even though the evidence is yet to come.

The bills that

passed the U.S. Congress, if the essential content of them is
really implemented, will make American product liability less
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expen sive.

These laws appea r to be lookin g in the same

direc tion, but from very differ ent starti ng point s.
There are two kinds of impor tant costs that usual ly move
in mutua lly differ ent direct ions in these reform s of produ ct
liabi lity. The first is the cost of consum ers' loss due to
their ignora nce or misco ncepti on of dange rs of a produ ct.

For

those who attach impor tance to the fact that a victim has the
choice to appea l to due proce ss of law and to be judged fairly
regar dless of the decisi on, this first cost is even more
impor tant.

The second is the cost involv ed in the legal

proce ss such as disco veries , settle ments , and trials .
Japan 's new PL Act aims to reduce the first kind of cost,
s
while U.S. moves to limit awards for produ ct liabi lity claim
show the way to moder ate the second kind of cost.
Japan 's direc tion is a struc tural reform .

Indeed ,

It does not

neces sarily mean dereg ulatio n becau se a firm is under a
strict er rule of condu ct with respe ct to defec tive produ cts.
Howev er, it should be noted that the attem pt to reduce the
s
econom ic cost of accide nts by the behav ior of priva te agent
ct
such as consum ers and produ cers under a given rule of produ
liabi lity is certai nly a marke t soluti on to produ ct hazard .
Then, how far should Japan 's legal system approa ch the
U.S. type of system .

Consum ers should be protec ted as much as

reason ably possi ble.

At the same time, howev er, the

deadw eight loss of legal or settle ment costs should not be
increa sed witho ut a prope r limit.
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Unles s the prese nt system

does not create many consumer victims out of ignorance, I am
inclined to think that Japan's system does not need to be
strengthened to approach genuine product liability.

But this

is surely a matter for serious debate.
No legal system stands alone.

The system functions only

if it is supported by economic and social systems on which the
legal system operates.

Therefore, it would be hard to create

an average of the American and Japanese systems.

The direct

grafting of the stem of one system into the other is
difficult.

A more practical way is to adapt a part of the

existing system by the wisdom we obtain from the other system.
In that sense, the movements in the two countries are welcome.
Even without grafting or harmonizing the systems, trade
and foreign investments make the handling of defective
products quite different from that of the closed economy.
Presumably, one would say, Japanese firms would have
advantages in their exports because they are not induced to
spend as much on the prevention of accidents or on legal
costs.

American firms have to spend much on legal costs.

Suppose these statements are true.

Even then, Japanese firms

have to meet the high American standards and the court costs
in the United States under free trade.

This will give

stronger incentives for Japanese firms to improve the safety
of their products.

Similarly, American firms will face a

little less stringent requirement.

In sum, international

trade will mitigate the systemic differences in product
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liability.
This factor may explain the puzzle that Japanese
products, though they are under less rigorous product
liability, seem to keep high quality.

The possibility of

being tested in foreign markets where the PL law is better
organized may be one of the reasons Japanese products have a
high safety standard.
not be enough.

This is a good explanation, but it may

One other important reason would be the peer

pressure in the industrial circle.

In the Japanese tradition,

the firm's name is like the authentic family name.

Selling a

defective product with your brand is like disgracing your
brand name, or your family name.

Is it my prejudice to say

that this kind of business psychology helps firms to continue
to produce safe products in Japan?
The strength and weakness of the American and Japanese
systems also have implications for bilateral and multilateral
international negotiations.

In the talks concerning non-trade

barriers between countries, or those concerning the new
international rule, the negotiation is centered around
legislation or an amendment of a law in the other country or
the international law.

The treatment of the subordinate right

of copyright is one example.
The fact that negotiators on the U.S. side are extremely
capable attorneys gives me some concern.

They seem to prefer,

partly due to the instinct of attorneys, more and more
litigious methods of conflict resolution.
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I hope that they do

not always insist on and succeed in imposing a highly
litigious system that has developed in the United States.
For, if they do, they might as well export the highly
expensive cost of the American system of conflict resolution,
which probably outweighs its benefit.
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APPENDIX I

The Product Liability Law (Law No. 85, 1994)
(tentative translation)
Article 1 [Purpose]
The purpose of this law is to relieve the inured person by
setting forth liability of the manufacturer, etc. for damages
when the injury on a life, a body, or property is caused by a
defect in the product, and thereby to contribute to the
stabilization and improvement of the people's life and to the
sound development of the national economy.
Article 2 [Definitions]
(1)

As used in this Law, the term "product" means
movable property manufactured or processed.

(2)

As used in this Law, the term "defect" means lack of
safety that the product ordinarily should provide,
taking into account the nature of the product, the
ordinarily foreseeable manner of use of the product,
the time when the manufacturer, etc. delivered the
product, and other circumstances concerning the
product.

(3)

As used in this Law, the term "manufacturer, etc."
means any one of the following:
1.

any person who manufactured, processed, or
imported the product as business (hereinafter
called just "manufacturer");

2.

any person who, by putting his name, trade
name, trade mark or other feature
(hereinafter called "representation of name,
etc.") on the product presents himself as
its manufacturer, or any person who puts the
representation of name, etc. on the product
in a manner mistakable for the manufacturer;

3.

apart from any person mentioned in the
preceding subsections, any person who, by
putting the representation of name, etc. on
the product, may be recognized as its
manufacturer-in-fa ct, in the light of a
manner concerning manufacturing, processing,
importation or sales, and other
circumstances.
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Article 3 [Product Liability]
The manufacturer, etc. shall be liable for damages caused by
the injury, when he injured someone's life, body or property
by the defect in his delivered product which he manufactured,
processed, imported or put the representation of name, etc. as
described in subsection 2 or 3 of section 3 of Article 2 on.
However, the manufacturer, etc. is not liable when only the
defective product itself is damaged.
Article 4 [Exemptions]
In cases where Article 3 applies, the manufacturer, etc. shall
not be liable as a result of Article 3 if he proves;
1.

that the state of scientific or technical knowledge
at the time when the manufacturer, etc. delivered
the product was not such as to enable the existence
of the defect in the product to be discovered; or

2.

in the case where the product is used as a component
or raw material of another product, that the defect
is substantially attributable to compliance with the
instruction concerning the specifications given by
the manufacturer of the said another product, and
that the manufacturer, etc. is not negligent on
occurrence of the defect.

Article 5 [Time Limitations]
{l)

The right for damages provided in Article 3 shall be
extinguished by prescription if the inured person or
his legal representative does not exercise such
right within 3 years from the time when he becomes
aware of the damage and the liable party for the
damage. The same shall also apply upon the expiry
of a period of 10 years from the time when the
manufacturer, etc. delivered the product.

(2)

The period in the latter sentence of section 1 of
this Article shall be calculated from the time when
the damage arises, where such damage is caused by
the substances which are harmful to human health
when they remain or accumulate in the body, or where
the symptoms for such damage appear after a certain
latent period.

Article 6 [Application of Civil Code]
In so far as this law does not provide otherwise, the
liability of the manufacturer, etc. for damages caused by a
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defect in the product shall be subject to the provisions of
the Civil Code (Law No. 89, 1896).
Supplementary Provisions
1.

Enforcement Date, etc.
This Law shall come into force the day after one
year from the date of promulgation, and shall apply
to the products delivered by the manufacturer, etc.
after this Law comes into force.

2.

Partial Amendment of the Law on Compensation for
Nuclear Damage
The Law on Compensation for Nuclear Damage (Law No.
147, 1961) shall be partially amended as follows:
In section 3 of Article 4 of that Law, "and the Law
relating to the Limitation of the Liability of
shipowners (Law No. 94, 1975)" shall be amended as,
"the Law relating to the Limitation of the Liability
of shipowners (Law No. 94, 1975) and the Product
Liability Law {Law No. 85, 1994)".
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